Two moral arguments for a global social cost of carbon by Mintz-Woo, Kian
UCC Library and UCC researchers have made this item openly available.
Please let us know how this has helped you. Thanks!
Title Two moral arguments for a global social cost of carbon
Author(s) Mintz-Woo, Kian
Publication date 2018-03-13
Original citation Mintz-Woo K. (2018) 'Two Moral Arguments for a Global Social Cost
of Carbon', Ethics, Policy & Environment, 21 (1), pp. 60-63. doi:
10.1080/21550085.2018.1448038





Access to the full text of the published version may require a
subscription.
Rights © 2018 the Author(s). Published by Informa UK limited, trading as
Taylor & Francis Group. This is an  Open Access article distributed
under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits
unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,






Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=cepe21
Ethics, Policy & Environment
ISSN: 2155-0085 (Print) 2155-0093 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cepe21
Two Moral Arguments for a Global Social Cost of
Carbon
Kian Mintz-Woo
To cite this article: Kian Mintz-Woo (2018) Two Moral Arguments for a Global Social Cost of
Carbon, Ethics, Policy & Environment, 21:1, 60-63, DOI: 10.1080/21550085.2018.1448038
To link to this article:  https://doi.org/10.1080/21550085.2018.1448038
© 2018 The Author(s). Published by Informa
UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis
Group
Published online: 13 Mar 2018.
Submit your article to this journal 
Article views: 699
View Crossmark data
Ethics, Policy & EnvironmEnt, 2018
vol. 21, no. 1, 60–63
https://doi.org/10.1080/21550085.2018.1448038
Two Moral Arguments for a Global Social Cost of Carbon
Kian Mintz-Woo 
Philosophy, University of Graz, Graz, Austria
Donald Trump’s executive order on energy limits the costs and benefits of carbon to domestic 
sources. The argument for this executive order is that carbon policies should not be singled out 
from other policies as globally inclusive. Two independent arguments are offered for adopting 
a global social cost of carbon. The first is based on reinforcing norms in the face of commons 
tragedies. The second is based on the limitations of consequentialist analyses. We can distinguish 
consequences for which probabilistic indifference is appropriate. The mechanisms for global 
effects for carbon are well-understood, whereas most policy effects are primarily domestic.
In March 2017, the Trump administration issued an executive order (EO) on Promoting Energy 
Independence and Economic Growth (White House, 2017). Among other things, the EO 
limits the included costs and benefits of carbon to domestic sources. More specifically, this 
applies to the social cost of carbon (SCC) or the monetized cost to society of increasing 
contemporary emissions by a marginal ton of carbon dioxide.1 In practice, when determining 
the estimated damages from that marginal ton of carbon dioxide, this change holds that 
only the expected domestic impacts are to be included.
While the choice between domestic or global SCCs may appear arcane or unimportant, 
here are two reasons to think otherwise. First, the actual impact of this rule change is signif-
icant. Since greenhouse gases are long-lived and disperse freely in the atmosphere, the 
effects of that marginal ton fall on many different countries in a highly varied manner; restrict-
ing the effects to any single country ignores international impacts, resulting to a lower SCC. 
Second, it acts as synecdoche for the broader orientation of the Trump administration. The 
question that the administration poses is whether nationals should care about foreigners.
The morally interesting puzzle is why, as the Obama administration and others contended, 
carbon regulatory analysis should appeal to (at least some) global costs and benefits, but 
not analyses of other targets of regulation (Fraas et al., 2016; Gayer & Viscusi, 2016). Other 
potential targets include, but are not limited to, terrorism, illegal drugs and infectious dis-
eases (Gayer & Viscusi, 2017). This is on its face surprising; what could be so special about 
the SCC when typical regulatory impact analyses only consider domestic impacts?
I offer two responses to this moral puzzle. The first is based on reinforcing norms in the 
face of commons tragedies with observable responses. The relevant fact about carbon is 
that its negative effects are predominantly global and not local. The second is based on the 
fundamental limits of consequentialist analysis. The relevant fact for this argument is that 
the physical mechanisms by which international impacts are propagated are well understood. 
If we can justify a global SCC from different moral premises, it is a morally robust claim.
© 2018  the Author(s). Published by informa UK limited, trading as taylor & Francis Group.
this is an open Access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons Attribution license (http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
CONTACT Kian mintz-Woo  kian.mintz-woo@edu.uni-graz.at
 OPEN ACCESS
ETHICS, POLICY & ENVIRONMENT  61
First, climate change is a global commons problem (e.g. Revesz et al., 2017; Vanderheiden, 
2008) or one with global negative externalities (e.g. Stern, 2015), meaning that costs of an 
action to others are not born by the actor.2 Global commons problems of this sort threaten 
to generate tragedies of the commons (Hardin, 1968): there are strong incentives against 
cooperating (i.e. acting in such a way where most benefits flow to others) and in many ver-
sions of such problems it is rational to defect (i.e. not cooperate). However, climate change 
is different from the standard version in several key aspects; two important ones are that it 
is iterated and that states can see what policies others are adopting.
This last point is key: with respect to climate change, states can observe whether other 
states are co-operating by instituting global SCCs. The states which have instituted SCCs 
have in almost all cases introduced ones with values that are greater than if they were purely 
domestic (cf. Howard & Schwartz, 2017, Appendix B). In the light of this key point, we can 
endorse the following principle:
Reinforcing norms. When facing commons problems where the value of cooperating accrues 
disproportionately to others and the problem is iterated and other members of the commons 
are known to be cooperating, in order to generate and reinforce cooperative norms, one also 
ought to cooperate.
The duty Reinforcing norms gives rise to is defeasible and may fail to apply when there are 
extremely weighty contrary moral considerations. However, since tragedies of the commons 
are so damaging and this principle can be used to avoid these tragedies, I suggest it has 
considerable normative force. Note that Reinforcing Norms does not give rise to the duty to 
be the first co-operator in a commons problem, but it does give rise to moral duties to follow 
other co-operators, even if one does not expect this to be the best strategic response. My 
claim is thus weaker than claims in the literature that countries (such as the United States) 
morally must lead with respect to climate change in light of their abilities and historical 
emissions (Maltais, 2014; Shue, 2011).
One could object that this should apply similarly with respect to many other problems 
like terrorism and infectious diseases. If one country fails to contain the spread of a zoonosis 
or a terrorist organization, that failure can impose further significant costs on the global 
community. However, emissions impose much larger global than domestic costs. Sometimes, 
terrorism or infectious diseases spread globally and, sometimes, they impose large global 
costs, but, unlike damages from emissions, the effects from these bads can be—and in the 
vast majority of cases are—limited geographically. For comparison, consider regulations 
requiring vaccinations. Like climate change, when people are properly vaccinated, many of 
the benefits in terms of herd immunity do not directly accrue to those vaccinated (Wang, 
Clymer, Davis-Hayes, & Buttenheim, 2014) and, like climate change, vaccination rates can be 
influenced by regulation (Orenstein & Hinman, 1999). However, the impact of reduction of 
vaccination predominantly applies regionally (Wang et al., 2014). In this manner, these other 
problems are not, or not as clearly, global commons problems, since the benefits of regula-
tion are primarily domestic.
Second, we can consider an argument for a global SCC from fundamental limitations in 
consequentialism. Cost–benefit analyses assume consequentialism, meaning that the deci-
sion to act in a particular way depends only on the consequences of that act—here, the act 
of regulating carbon dioxide emissions. One could be worried that consequentialists cannot 
completely evaluate any act because the actual consequences of those actions can be distant 
in time and place and very great either in positive or negative ways (Lenman, 2000). The 
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usual response is to appeal only to the consequences which are expected or believed to 
result from the act. What about the other consequences? If we lack understanding of mech-
anisms by which we could understand how acting in a particular way or refraining from 
acting in the same way would lead to a particular outcome, then we do not need to consider 
those effects in our analysis. This is because consideration of those effects would not reverse 
judgements made only by considering expected effects; intuitively, their value would cancel 
out between acting or refraining (Greaves, 2016).
This position also justifies distinguishing between acts like regulating carbon and regu-
lating to prevent other bads like terrorism or illegal drugs. The international effects of reg-
ulation aimed at these other bads are much more speculative than the international effects 
of decreased carbon emissions. This is because of the well-understood basic physical mech-
anisms of climate change (IPCC, 2014, SPM 1.3). Since we understand the basic physical 
mechanisms well, we cannot justify excluding them from our cost–benefit analyses; there-
fore, we ought to include all (i.e. the global) effects into our SCC. In contrast, the mechanisms 
by which terrorism and illegal drugs spread globally are complex and contingent; to the 
extent our epistemic condition with respect to these bads make it unclear whether given 
regulation helps prevent or spread them internationally, the foregoing claims mean that we 
are justified in not considering the global effects with respect to these regulations.
These two arguments justify adoption of a global SCC. They show that, at least in this 
respect, contra the claims of the Trump administration, we should consider the global impli-
cations of our actions.
Notes
1.  While there are small benefits associated with smaller levels of increased carbon dioxide on 
items like crop yield, the majority of effects would be costs (IPCC, 2014, SPM 1.3). Therefore, 
for simplicity, I refer to costs, but this caveat applies throughout.
2.  For our purposes, we do not need to distinguish these cases; the argument applies regardless 
of which way it is framed. For ease of exposition, I use the commons framing throughout.
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